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Minimal Reduction of Unscheduled Flows
for Security Restoration: Application
to Phase Shifter Control
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Abstract—More and more transmission system operators,
noticeably in Europe, equip their systems with phase shifting
transformers to counteract transit flows that take place in a large
meshed interconnection. This paper proposes algorithms for the
coordinated control of several phase shifters by one operator with
the objective of reducing the unscheduled flow through its system.
Minimum reduction of unscheduled flow and minimum deviation
with respect to present operating point are sought in order to
minimize the trouble caused, while ensuring secure operation.
Attention is paid to combining pre- and post-contingency controls.
The resulting algorithms, simple and compatible with real-time
applications, are illustrated on a realistic test system.
Index Terms—Corrective control, correctively secure operation,
optimal power flow, phase shifting transformer, preventive control,
transit flow, unscheduled flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Transit Flows: Causes and Consequences
L OOP flows, parallel path flows, inadvertent flows, and cir-culating flows are synonymous terms that basically refer
to the fact that power can flow through several paths in a meshed
network [1]. The term transit flow is used by European transmis-
sion system operators (ETSO) [2] and is adopted throughout the
paper.
This share of flow between parallel paths has been observed
in large interconnections since the early 1960s. In the USA, par-
allel flows have been reported in the PJM interconnection as
well as in the WECC system [1]. Transit flows are also common
in Europe, where the borders of some countries are crossed, at
least partially, by power exchanges involving other countries
[3], [4]. This situation is symbolically depicted in Fig. 1 where a
fraction of the power due to external transaction passes through
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Fig. 1. Transit flow due to external transaction.
the network not involved in the transaction. In recent times,
transit flows have played an important role in the 2003 North
American blackout [5] and in cross-border trading in European
markets [6], thus necessitating proper management.
In large interconnections, consisting of several areas operated
by different transmission system operators (TSO), the common
practice is to plan inter-area transactions in advance, in forward,
day-ahead, or even intra-day markets. For the sake of coordina-
tion, available transfer capacities (ATC) are computed between
the different areas, taking into account security criteria. The final
transactions settlements should respect these ATCs.
In real-time operation, however, actual power flows may
differ significantly from what has been scheduled in ahead.
This may originate from:
• unknown or uncoordinated transactions involving other
partners in the interconnection, for instance if transactions
are scheduled according to the contract path logic without
making use of a flow-based model of the whole intercon-
nection;
• changes in external generation pattern, e.g., due to wind
generation variability;
• outage of external equipments.
The unscheduled flow (UF), i.e., the discrepancy between ac-
tual and expected flows, becomes a concern when it adds to
the loading of inner and interconnection transmission lines and
endangers security, moving the system to insecure state (when
some credible contingencies could not be stood) or even emer-
gency state (when thermal limits are overstepped even in the
current operating conditions) [4], [7].
0885-8950/$26.00 © 2009 IEEE
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B. Accommodating versus Controlling Unscheduled Flows
Several procedures are in place to deal with UFs [8]–[11]. As
long as it does not endanger security, a certain level of UF can
be accommodated and priced. On the other hand, curtailment of
transactions, such as in the transmission loading relief procedure
used in the USA, or re-dispatch of generation may be required
in severe situations.
Additionally, power flows can be controlled by phase shifting
transformers (PSTs) or possibly the faster, but more expensive
FACTS devices [1], [4], [11]–[13]. PSTs are among the few con-
trols, together with topology changes, that fully remain in the
hands of TSOs. With reference to Fig. 1, the two PSTs can be
controlled in a coordinated way to reduce the fraction of power
flow passing through as a result of the transaction from G to
D. More PSTs are likely to be installed for increased control of
transit flows, as testified by the situation in Belgium, where three
PSTs are going to be put in operation on the Northern border of
the country [14], [15].
In the European interconnection, an ex post inter-TSO pay-
ment has been put into practice since 2002. Countries receive
a compensation for the use made by external agents of their
networks. At the same time, they are charged for their use of
the other partners’ networks. The net outcome of the compen-
sation and charges for one country must be used to modify the
annual regulated transmission cost from which the transmission
tariffs are computed. This results in a system of entry/exit tar-
iffs whereby an agent who pays the modified local access tariff
gains access to the entire European grid. Losses are compen-
sated, while for infrastructure, the compensation is based on
the cost of hosting cross-border flows [16], [17]. However, no
real-time inter-TSO coordination procedure exists in Europe yet
to mitigate UFs.
C. Objective of This Work
This paper deals with the real-time restoration of security
when the appearance of some UF causes the system to operate
in insecure or even emergency mode (i.e., the system would be
in normal and secure state without the UF). Ahead scheduling
through an ATC-type procedure is assumed to be in operation,
as well as a real-time or ex post UF accommodation and com-
pensation scheme.
A real-time control tool is proposed enabling a TSO to
quickly restore security in its system through actions on its own
controls. At the same time, this control is aimed at being as un-
intrusive as possible for the rest of the interconnection [18]. The
first motivation for not acting more than needed (and not acting
at all when not required) is to facilitate overall system operation
and not to create congestions elsewhere. A second motivation
may come from the above-mentioned ex post financial scheme
which compensates the TSO for accommodating the UF.
In this context, the possibility is considered to let the system
operate without satisfying the strict security criterion,
but take advantage of post-disturbance corrective actions. Since
equipment outages are relatively rare events, it is cost-effective
to operate the system at the economic (or market) optimum that
corresponds to its present (intact) configuration, and wait for
the disturbance occurrence to take corrective action. However,
post-contingency adjustments may be limited, given the time
left by thermal overloads, because the operator is unavailable
or not trained to react or because of constraints related to the
functioning of the available controls (generator ramps, change
of PST settings, etc.). This suggests that a compromise should
be found between preventive and corrective control actions.
This fits the general problem of operating the system in the
optimal, correctively secure manner [19]–[21]. The general ap-
proach to this problem is the corrective security constrained op-
timal power flow (CSCOPF).
However, as UFs are to be handled in real time, resorting
to a standard CSCOPF may prove inappropriate, owing to the
complexity of this approach. Instead, through the introduction
of an inequality constraint on the UF and the use of a specific
decomposition procedure, the proposed algorithm avoids the
above complexity and yields a procedure more compatible with
real-time application.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the above
simplification of the CSCOPF problem is exposed. The mathe-
matical expression of the UF used to this purpose is presented in
Section III. After this general presentation, the approach is ap-
plied specifically to the coordinated PST control in Section IV,
considering a simplified optimization. An illustrative example
is detailed in Section V, while various additional aspects are
discussed in Section VI. The Conclusion in Section VII sum-
marizes the main features of the approach.
II. OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE
A. Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow
Security constrained optimal power flow is the framework
that has been advocated for a long time to support security con-
trol activities in power systems. This problem itself has been for-
mulated under two modes: preventive (PSCOPF) and corrective
(CSCOPF). In the former, the adjustment of control variables
in post-contingency states is not allowed, except if stemming
from automatic response to contingencies. The underlying as-
sumption of CSCOPF is that operational limits violation can be
generally tolerated for some time without equipment damages,
thereby allowing post-contingency corrective actions to be im-
plemented.
The CSCOPF approach of interest in this work can be com-







The objective may be either economical (e.g., maximize so-
cial welfare) or technical (e.g., minimize deviations with re-
spect to a reference stemming from market). (respectively, )
denotes the vector of state (respectively, control) variables in
the pre-contingency configuration, (2) are the pre-contingency
power flow equations and (3) the corresponding operating con-
straints, is the number of contingencies, and are the state
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and control variables in the th post-contingency configuration,
with the corresponding power flow equations (4) and operating
constraints (5). Finally, is the vector of bounds on the
variation of control variables between the base case and the th
post-contingency state.
For some problems, the above general formulation may not be
the most appropriate. The obvious issue is the high dimension-
ality of the problem, resulting in prohibitive computing times
and complexity of computations. To mitigate these drawbacks,
the usual approach is to consider a subset of potentially ac-
tive contingencies, identified by means of (steady-state) secu-
rity analysis and contingency filtering techniques [20]. Benders
decomposition has been also proposed [19], [22], as will be dis-
cussed in Section VI-C. Even with these mitigating approaches,
designing a CSCOPF compatible with real-time requirements
remains a challenge for large systems and/or when many contin-
gencies are considered. For the specific situation of UFs threat-
ening security, the simplification explained hereafter makes the
problem much more compatible with real-time requirements.
B. Simplifying the Optimization Problem
We consider the impact of contingencies such as branch or
generator outages. We assume that the system has entered an
insecure (or even emergency) state with respect to some con-
tingencies owing to an excessive transit flow.1 Exploiting this
correlation between excessive transit flow and severity of con-
tingencies, the idea is to force the transit flow to decrease up to
the point where the system is correctively secure.






where represents the transit flow and a bound on the
latter. The function is defined more precisely in the next
section. Let be the value of the objective at the optimum.
A variation of with is sketched in Fig. 2. Consider
a progressive decrease of , starting from a large value for
which the constraint (10) is not binding. At point A, this con-
straint becomes active and starts impacting the value . From
there on, the smaller , the larger . At the same time,
smaller and smaller values of the transit flow are forced and,
hence, the impact of contingencies becomes less severe. There-
fore, we assume that there exists a point O, where the system
becomes correctively secure and remains so for even smaller
values of . The curve stops at point B, where (7)–(10) be-
comes infeasible if is further decreased.
Point O is the sought operating point in the proposed method.
Operating at this point is interesting because security is restored
1In fact, the unscheduled part of the transit flow is expected to be respon-
sible for insecurity. For the scheduled part, the system should have been already
checked and made secure.
Fig. 2. Variation of objective function with   .
but the transit flow is decreased to the least extent, thereby dis-
turbing the external system as little as possible.
Point O can be determined by searching iteratively for ,
the largest value of such that the system is correctively
secure. This single-dimensional search is simple. For a given
, the corresponding OPF (7)–(10) is solved to obtain the
pre-contingency operating state and controls . The next
step is to determine if this operating state is correctively secure.
For the th contingency , we check whether
there exists (at least) one with , such that
the post-contingency state given by (4) satisfies the operating







where denotes a column vector with all components equal to
1. If the solution of this problem is such that , then the
post-contingency operating point is correctively secure.
An alternative way to check for the existence of , chosen






If this turns out to be infeasible, it can be concluded that the
post-contingency operating point is not correctively secure. The
advantage of this approach is that, if the optimization is feasible,
its solution provides the operator with a set of post-contingency
control actions that can be stored and implemented directly if
the contingency ever actually occurs. Typically, the objective
deals with control adjustments; alternatively, the objective of
the pre-contingency OPF problem could be reused.
The operating point is not correctively secure if there is at
least one contingency making (16)–(19) infeasible.
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Fig. 3. Proposed decomposed CSCOPF approach.
C. Proposed Decomposed CSCOPF Approach
Fig. 3 shows the various steps of the proposed approach. First,
contingencies are simulated. If none of them creates a limit vi-
olation, the procedure stops; otherwise, the possibility to cor-
rect the violations in post-contingency conditions is checked by
solving the OPF problem (16)–(19) for each contingency (block
1). If all problems are feasible, the system is correctively se-
cure and the procedure terminates. Otherwise, insecurity being
attributed to an excessive transit flow, (initialized to the
observed transit flow) is set to a lower value (block 2), and the
corresponding pre-contingency states and controls are ob-
tained by solving the OPF problem (7)–(10) (block 3). Based
on the latter, corrective security is checked again by block 1. If
some contingencies still cannot be corrected, the value of
is further decreased by block 2, while if all contingencies can be
corrected, a higher value of is tried. The procedure con-
tinues refining the value of until is known up to some
tolerance.
The above description clearly shows that by introducing (10)
and iterating on , the original large problem (1)–(6) has
been decomposed into much simpler subproblems: the
problem (7)–(10) relative to pre-contingency conditions and the
problems (16)–(19) relative to post-contingency.
Of course, adding the constraint (10) yields a suboptimal so-
lution, but this may be quite acceptable in a real-time environ-
ment. Further discussion of this aspect is provided in the results.
III. FORMULATION OF THE TRANSIT FLOW
There is no unique definition of a transit flow, and there is
some degree of arbitrariness in its definition. We introduce here-
after the notion used throughout this work, with the objective of
using it in the inequality constraint (10).
Consider a system exchanging power with the remaining of
the interconnection through tie-lines, in which the active power
flows are counted positively when exiting the system. Intu-
itively, there is a transit flow if some lines are bringing power in
and some others are taking it out. This means that not all ’s
have the same sign. We thus define the transit flow as
(20)
Fig. 4. Transit flow as a function of external transaction.
In this expression, is the net power interchange (typically
controlled by AGC if the system coincides with a control area),
a positive value indicating a net power export. Clearly, if all ’s
have the same sign, then and . If
not all flows have the same sign, whatever the net power
interchange.2
The effect of an external transaction is easily shown in the fol-
lowing example. Consider Fig. 1, with the base case power flows
shown next to the tie-lines. The transit flow computed from (20)
is 50 MW. Assume now that a transaction takes place from G
to D, with 40% of the additional power passing through . As-
sume furthermore the following flow distribution (the variation
of losses being neglected): in line L1, in L2,
in L3, and nothing in L4. Thus, the power flow is in
line L1, in L2, in L3, and 50 in L4.
The variation of with is shown with solid line in Fig. 4. The
transit flow does not change as long as remains below 250
MW. Indeed, no line flow changes sign; instead, a mere redis-
tribution of flows is taking place. For larger than 250 MW, the
flow in L1 reverses and the transit flow starts increasing as ex-
pected. A similar observation is made for a reverse transactions
. The dotted line in Fig. 4 refers to a base case with an
initial flow of 50 MW in L3. In this case, the transaction cre-
ates a counterflow in both L1 and L3 and makes the transit flow
decrease until exceeds 250 MW.
Note that (20) includes both scheduled and unscheduled parts
of the transit flow. As indicated earlier, it is likely that system
security has been checked for the scheduled part and insecurity
stems from the unscheduled part.
IV. APPLICATION TO PHASE SHIFTER CONTROL
A. Modeling Simplifications
In the remaining of this paper, the decomposition method pre-
sented in the previous section is applied to security restoration
through PST control. Since the emphasis is on coordinated con-
trol of PSTs instead of OPF algorithms, the following simpli-
fying assumptions are made:
1) a linear model is considered, for simplicity and computa-
tional efficiency. Although it might be obtained right away
2Compared to the definition given in [23], the above formula gives the same
transit flow values but allows an analytical treatment.
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from the well-known dc approximation, a linearization of
the ac power flow equations has been considered in this
work. This assumption is justified by the almost linear vari-
ation of active power flows with PST angles;
2) control variables are assumed to be the PST angles only.
We seek here for dedicated algorithms that can quickly help
operators in the specific task of adjusting PSTs, or in some
future even adjust the PSTs automatically;
3) the objective function is of technical (instead of econom-
ical) nature. A minimum change of PST angles is consid-
ered. The motivation may be to minimize the increase in
power losses that generally accompanies such changes, or
to deviate as few as possible from the operating point set
by the market, especially when PSTs are used to increase
transactions [24].
Under assumption 1, the branch active power flows vary
with PST angles according to
(21)
where and are the base case values of the power flows and
phase angles, respectively, and is a sensitivity matrix,
where is the number of branches and the number of PSTs.
The PSTs have no influence on the net power interchange,
under the approximation that the power losses remain un-
changed. Thus, the expression
(22)
does not vary with the PST angles. Using (20) and (22), the
transit flow constraint can be rewritten as
(23)
B. Controllability of Transit Flow by PSTs
We assume that the available PSTs are able to control the
transit flow up to a certain point. To this purpose, there must
be an adequate number of PSTs, they must be properly located
so that the terms of the matrix relating tie-line power flows
to phase angles are large enough, and the range of PST angles
should be wide enough. These important aspects, to be decided
at the planning stage, are out of scope of this paper [3], [26].
In practice, the number, location, and range of PSTs may not
make it possible to decrease the transit flow below some value.
The smallest transit flow that can be enforced with the available
PSTs can be computed as
is also the smallest value of such that the optimization
problem (24)–(28) is feasible. It corresponds to point B in Fig. 2.
C. Pre-Contingency OPF
With a minimum deviation objective, the linear model (21)
and the transit flow constraint (23), the pre-contingency OPF






where (26) accounts for the thermal limits of the branches, and
(27) for the available range of PST angles. For a low enough
, the constraint (28) will be active at the optimum, unless
an active constraint (26) forces a lower transit flow.
An -norm objective can be also consid-
ered but has been found to cause undesirable distortion of power
flows, as it tends to make full use of controls with higher sen-
sitivities. The norm (24) distributes the control effort more
evenly over the PSTs.
Since the PSTs are discrete devices, each has to be rounded
to the value corresponding to the nearest tap position.
To deal with the absolute value in (28), it is convenient to
define two new variables, respectively, and , such that
with . The constraint (28) is then
rewritten as
D. Post-Contingency OPF
Let be the solution of the pre-contingency OPF (24)–(28).
The post-contingency OPF problem (16)–(19), aimed at
checking if the system is correctively secure with respect to the






where is the post-contingency sensitivity matrix and
the vector of post-contingency branch flows, provided by a pre-
liminary contingency analysis. The constraint (33) expresses
that in post-contingency conditions, PST angles cannot be
changed from the pre-contingency values by more than
, which is supposed to reflect the limited rate of change
of PSTs and/or the initial response delay of operators. The
choice of the objective has been discussed in Section II-B.
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Fig. 5. Test system structure and base case operating point.
The following items are noteworthy:
1) the above optimization has to be performed for each con-
tingency endangering the system. Obviously, the correc-
tion is expected to vary with the contingency;
2) in the above procedure, it is implicitly assumed that the
available PSTs have controllability over the overload
problem. Thus, the contingencies of concern here are
those that can be corrected by the PSTs. To check this, the
above optimization can be performed with the constraints
(33) removed. If the problem remains infeasible, the PSTs
cannot help, and the corresponding contingencies should
be treated by other means;
3) may change with the contingency severity: a
higher overload must be corrected in a smaller time and
hence a smaller should be imposed.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
A. Test System
The results have been obtained on a test system, loosely in-
spired of a small portion of the UCTE system. Its overall struc-
ture is shown in Fig. 5. It is made up of four subsystems, corre-
sponding to different countries and different TSOs. The figure
provides the number of buses in each subsystem. The subsystem
of Country 2 is equipped with two PSTs, identified by PH1 and
PH2.
The active power flows that exist in the base case situation,
with both PST angles equal to zero are shown in Fig. 5. The
transit flow through Country 2 is
.
A deeper look at the diagram reveals the presence of a
“major” and a “minor” loop. The major loop includes the
tie-lines connecting the four systems. Inside this loop, Coun-
tries 1 and 3 are exporting power while Countries 2 and 4 are
importing. The two PSTs of Country 2 are placed cutting the
loop, in parallel to each other. Moving their angles in the same
direction, the TSO of Country 2 can redirect some power flow
from path 3-2-4 towards path 3-1-4. The minor loop includes
two paths from north to south of Country 2, one through the
Fig. 6. Power flows after tripping of line N76-N32_1.
internal lines N76-N32 and N76-N32_1 and the other through
the tie-lines N87-N56 and N58-N71. The two PSTs are placed
in series with each other inside this minor loop, and moving
their angles in opposite directions redistributes the power
between the two above-mentioned paths.
B. Security Analysis
We consider security analysis in Country 2. Out of all
contingencies, two of them end up in line overloads: the loss of
lines N76-N32 and N76-N32_1. Fig. 6 shows the distribution
of power flows after the tripping of N76-N32_1: line N76-N32
is significantly loaded above its capacity of 1215 MW (taken
as 90% of its MVA capacity to account for reactive power and
leave a security margin).
As for the security analysis of any system nested inside an
interconnection, a correct representation of the external system
(Countries 1, 3, and 4 in this case) is essential to assess the effect
of both contingencies and PST adjustments. The tests have been
performed assuming that the whole system model is available
to the TSO of Country 2, but an equivalent, or a combination of
unreduced and equivalent models, could be also used to account
for the system external to Country 2.
C. Linearization
The model is obtained by linearizing the ac power flow equa-
tions as follows.
We start from a base case situation with PST angles and
power flows . The sparse power flow Jacobian is computed at
this operating point and LU-decomposed. Using a well-known
sensitivity formula [25], each column of the matrix is obtained
by solving one sparse linear system involving the available fac-
tors of the transposed Jacobian. , , and are reused each
time the pre-contingency problem (24)–(28) is solved (block 3
in Fig. 3) to obtain an updated .
Before solving the post-contingency problem (29)–(33)
(block 1 in Fig. 3), and given the PST angles , a full ac power
flow is solved to obtain the flows that result from both
the th contingency and the pre-contingency PST adjustments.
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Fig. 7. Power flows after tripping of line N76-N32_1 and corrective control by
PSTs.
The corresponding Jacobian is LU-decomposed and used to
determine the matrix, using the above-mentioned formula.
The power flow model used to compute the and ma-
trices involves the external system, unreduced and/or equiva-
lenced, according to what is available to the TSO of concern.
The former option has been considered in this work.
Thanks to the very close to linear relationship between branch
power flows and PST angles, as well as the sensitivity matrix up-
dates, the linearized model was found to be extremely accurate.
A comparison of power flows obtained from, respectively, the
linearized and the full ac power flow models, revealed discrep-
ancies no larger than 0.2 MW on the branch flows.
D. Corrective Control of Line Overloads by PSTs
Before the application of the algorithm, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of the PSTs in alleviating the overload caused by
the tripping of line N76-N32_1, which is the contingency re-
quiring the largest control effort.
We first consider the PST angles that correctively clear the
overload without any limit of the type (33). We thus solve the
optimization problem (29)–(32) with equal to the base case
values . The angles and the resulting power flows
are shown in Fig. 7. The line flow is reduced below its limit
thanks to: 1) a common decrease of PST angles that redistributes
the flows in the major loop, decreasing the transit flow though
Country 2 from 1280 to 1175 MW; and 2) a more pronounced
action of PH2 that redistributes the flows inside the minor loop.
If the post-contingency change of from 0 to (see
Fig. 7) is deemed too large and limited to a lower value,
cannot compensate and the optimization problem (29)–(32) be-
comes infeasible, indicating that the system is not correctively
secure.
E. Preventive Restoration of Corrective Security
We now illustrate the method presented in Section II (see also
Fig. 3) to make the system secure with respect to both contin-
gencies previously mentioned.
TABLE I
ITERATIONS TO RESTORE CORRECTIVE SECURITY
TABLE II
PREVENTIVE AND CORRECTIVE PST SETTINGS FOR VARIOUS  
We assume a maximum post-contingency angle change
of 10 . Hence, for the initial operating point shown
in Fig. 5, the system is not correctively secure (as shown in
Section V-D for the loss of line N76-N32_1) and the PST angles
have to be adjusted in the pre-contingency configuration.
A binary search (also known as dichotomic search, or bisec-
tion method) is used in block 2 of Fig. 3 to determine the highest
value of such that the system is correctively secure. This
consists in building a smaller and smaller interval such
that for , the system is correctively secure while for
, it is not. At each step, the value
is tested and taken as the new (respectively, ) if the system is
found correctively secure (respetively, insecure). The procedure
is repeated until becomes smaller than a tolerance . The
best initial value for is (discussed in Section IV-B) but a 0
MW value has been taken in the tests, saving the computation of
at the expense of an additional iteration of the binary search.
has been initialized at the base transit flow (1315 MW).
The main results are listed in Table I. At the first iteration,
with set to , the optimization of
block 3 is infeasible, meaning that the PSTs cannot force such a
low transit flow. Obviously, block 1 cannot be executed. Thus,
after setting to 658 MW, we proceed with the second iteration,
corresponding to .
The third and fourth columns of Table I give the pre-contin-
gency settings determined by block 3, while the last column in-
dicates whether this new operating point is found correctively
secure by block 1. The tolerance being set to 25 MW, the pro-
cedure stops after six iterations.
The settings to be finally actually implemented, in a preven-
tive mode, are and , which decrease the
transit flow to 1213 MW.
Table II presents the results obtained by repeating the proce-
dure for various values of . The
second and third columns give the pre-contingency PST angles,
leading to the transit flow value shown in the fourth column. The
last two columns provide the final values that should be given
to PST angles, in the post-contingency configuration, to clear
the line overload caused by the tripping of N76-N32_1. As ex-
pected, the more one resorts to corrective control actions (i.e.,
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the larger ), the less the pre-contingency operating point
is changed (and, hence, the less intrusive the change in transit
flow).
The variations observed in the table can be explained as fol-
lows. First, the post-contingency angles are the closest to the
pre-contingency ones that alleviate the post-contingency
overloads. Second, for some pre-contingency PST angle set-
tings, may be not large enough to allow for post-con-
tingency correction. In this case, the pre-contingency angles are
modified in the direction that reduces the transit flow, resulting
into new values of . As a result, when seeking for post-contin-
gency corrections, starting from the new , different post-con-
tingency settings will be found (still closest to this new ). This
is why the post-contingency settings vary so much with .
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Requirements of the Method
The following conditions have to be fulfilled for the proposed
procedure to be successful. First, the available PSTs must have
controllability over the transit flow. Second, the contingency
should be secured by decreasing the transit flow. A typical sit-
uation is when a corridor is loaded by the transit flow and the
outage of a line in this corridor causes overload of parallel lines.
If the transit flow reduction cannot help, the contingency will re-
main harmful at the minimum flow .
If these conditions are not met, another objective and/or addi-
tional (probably more expensive) controls should be considered
to address the security problem.
B. Optimality of the Method
Fig. 8 shows a characterization of the pre-contingency oper-
ating points corresponding to various values of . This
diagram was obtained by repeatedly solving the optimization
problem (29)–(33) with set to each pair of integer
values in the shown range. The maximum post-contingency
correction was set to 10 , as in Table I. At the points
shown with crosses, the optimization problem was infeasible;
hence, the system is not correctively secure. At the points
shown with circles, the problem had a solution, indicating that
the system is correctively secure. Finally, at the points shown
with disks, the contingencies were harmless and the system
secure; there was thus no need for PST adjustments.
Assume that the system is operating initially at
. The arrow that starts from this point in Fig. 8 is
the path of (pre-contingency) PST angles obtained by solving
(24)–(28) for decreasing values of in (28), i.e., smaller
and smaller transit flow. The points generated by block 3 of
the proposed procedure (see Fig. 3) lie on this path. The binary
search converges to the point , where
the arrow enters the correctively secure region.
The variations of the post-contingency angle settings shown
in Table II can be further explained in the light of Fig. 8. For
smaller , the correctively secure region shrinks closer to
the secure area. Hence, when moving along the arrow in Fig. 8
(which decreases the transit flow), the operating point enters the
correctively secure region for different angle settings. In partic-
ular, with , this happens for ,
from which the closest secure angle settings are .
Fig. 8. Characterization of pre-contingency operating points.
In fact, there are many ways to enter the correctively secure
region. For instance, minimizing the Euclidian distance to the
initial point would lead to the solution
. This operating point is closer to the
initial point but at this point the operation of system 2 is more
disturbed due to a significant redistribution of power flows in-
side the minor loop. The proposed algorithm does not yield this
solution because the pre-contingency changes are constrained
to obey (28). In fact, having attributed the security problem to
a certain cause (an excessive transit flow), the algorithm tries to
find the closest correctively secure operating point towards the
direction that mitigates this cause.
Assume now that the initial operating point is
. The search direction is parallel to the pre-
viously discussed path, until hits its minimum of ,
causing the path to change direction. In this case, the binary
search will converge to .
The fact that the search is limited towards the direction that
mitigates may lead to not finding a solution. This happens
when is small, shrinking the correctively secure region
and causing the path to pass around it. In addition, if the require-
ments listed in Section VI-A are not met, the correctively secure
region will not be reached by applying the method, since either
the search direction will not be towards this region, or the PSTs
will not be able to affect the transit flow and hence move the
operating point towards the sought direction.
C. Analogy With Benders Decomposition
The proposed problem decomposition offers some similari-
ties with the Benders decomposition method [19], [21], [22],
[27], [28] from which it differs, however, as discussed hereafter.
In the context of PSCOPF and CSCOPF, the most appealing
application of Benders decomposition consists of splitting the
original problem into:
• one master problem, in which a solution is found to the
pre-contingency subproblem (1)–(3); and
• several smaller slave problems, each dealing with one con-
tingency and checking if there exists a control satisfying
(4)–(6).
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Each infeasible slave subproblem generates the so-called feasi-
bility cut constraint to be added at the next iteration to the master
problem. Iterations between the master and the slave subprob-
lems continue, with the cuts updated at each iteration, until the
original problem (1)–(6) is solved to some tolerance.
In the proposed approach the problem is also split into a
master problem dealing with the pre-contingency situation
(block 3 in Fig. 3) and slave problems, each relative to a
post-contingency situation (block 1 in the same figure). The
information passed from slave to master problems is used to
adjust the pre-contingency operating point.
However, the main differences with respect to Benders
method lie in both the nature and the handling of the infor-
mation returned to the master problem. The latter consists of
a synthetic two-valued variable per contingency. The values
stemming from the various contingencies are easily combined
into a single infeasible/feasible information. Instead of adding
mathematical constraints to the master optimization, the en-
gineering knowledge of the problem (insecurity attributed to
transit flow) drives the pre-contingency adjustments. While
being less general (the situation of Fig. 2 must apply) and
suboptimal (to the extent discussed in the previous section), the
proposed scheme guarantees fast convergence to the solution,
as a binary search is used to find point O in Fig. 2. This may
not be the case with Benders decomposition, as quoted in
some papers reporting on the non-monotonic decrease of the
objective function [21] or the slow final convergence (known as
“tailing-off effect”) [28]. Finally, with Benders decomposition,
the size and the structure of the master problem vary from one
iteration to the other, depending on the cut constraints added.
This is not the case in the proposed method.
D. Computational Efficiency
Several features contribute to making the overall procedure
suitable for real-time applications.
First, the decomposition presented in Section II (and appli-
cable to nonlinear CSCOPF) succeeds replacing the highly-di-
mensional problem (1)–(6) with smaller subproblems. The bi-
nary search leads to a low, predictable number of iterations,
which could even be decreased by extrapolating/interpolating
the next value of the transit flow from past iterations.
As regards the particular application to PST control consid-
ered in Section IV:
• the linearized formulation allows resorting to proven, effi-
cient optimization solvers;
• by focusing on the PSTs, the optimization involves a re-
duced number of control variables;
• the computation of a sensitivity matrix involves factor-
izing the sparse power flow Jacobian and substituting one
sparse vector per column of the matrix, i.e., per PST. Ef-
ficient sparsity programming solvers are available to this
purpose. Furthermore, the optimal ordering step can be per-
formed once for all in the pre-contingency topology.
E. Control of PSTs by Multiple TSOs
This paper focuses on the control of PSTs owned by a single
TSO. Note, however, that the control of PSTs by multiple
TSOs within an interconnection raises coordination issues. For
instance, several TSOs having PSTs and using them to reduce
a transit flow could end up in a situation where the effect of
the PSTs cancel each other out. Reference [29] illustrated other
interactions that may result from conflicting TSO policies.
By keeping PST control transparent and as few intrusive as
possible, the approach of this paper contributes to avoiding the
above-mentioned conflicts. The issue, however, deserves further
consideration. A possible framework was proposed in [30]. The
proposed solution is the Nash equilibrium of a sequence of opti-
mizations performed by the various TSOs, each of them taking
into account the other TSO’s settings as well as operating con-
straints relative to the whole system. The key for the success of
the procedure is that all TSOs should be willing to provide the
other TSOs with information about the system for which they
are responsible.
VII. CONCLUSION
The coordinated control of multiple PSTs to decrease un-
scheduled flow experienced by a TSO inside an interconnection
has been considered.
First, a definition of the transit flow has been proposed, linked
to tie-line power flows in opposite directions.
Next, a simplification to the general corrective security-con-
strained optimal power flow problem has been proposed, which
allows decomposing this large-scale problem into simpler sub-
problems. Based on the assumption that the security problem
can be attributed to an excessive transit flow, the algorithm in-
vestigates a sequence of pre-contingency operating points to-
wards the direction that decreases this flow. It converges to the
correctively secure operating point with the transit flow reduced
to the lowest extent possible. By so doing, the control is aimed
at being as few intrusive as possible for other TSOs in the inter-
connection.
Finally, this approach has been applied to the reduction of
an excessive transit flow by PSTs in order to deal with insecure
situations. The algorithm determines the best possible combina-
tion of pre- and post-contingency PST adjustments, with limits
specified on the post-contingency angle changes.
The features and limitations of this procedure have been il-
lustrated on a test system.
The embedded optimization problems are simple and suitable
to real-time operation. The method could assist the operator in
quickly checking if transit flow control by PSTs can restore se-
curity or if more expensive actions are needed. The algorithm
could be at the heart of a controller coordinating the PSTs, and
allowing faster post-contingency adjustments.
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